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The use of biotechnologies to enhance human beings poses many complex and 
interesting ethical questions. Better than Human is a slimmed-down paperback edition 
of Allen BuchananÕs Beyond Humanity1 - the latter aimed at an academic audience of 
bioethicists and moral philosophers, and Better than Human written for a wider 
audience. It presents an engaging, friendly introduction to the ethics of biomedical 
enhancement (BME), while retaining and conveying the complexity of the ethical 
issues. In Better than Human, Buchanan defends an optimistic view about the 
potential of BME to make humans Ôbetter than wellÕ (p 173). The technological and 
ethical ground covered is extensive. He begins with the (perhaps) ethically less 
problematic use of cognitive enhancement drugs such as Ritalin (Chapter 1), then 
continues through cloning and the genetic enhancement of embryos (Chapters 3 and 
4), and a look to a future of human-computer interface technologies and biomedical 
moral enhancement (Chapters 5 and 6). The book is a clarion call for the 
legitimisation and social, political and legal regulation of BME, in pursuit of human 
(better-than)-well-being. 
 
A central feature of the book is BuchananÕs rejection of extreme positions. He 
opposes ÔBME exceptionalismÕ (p 124) and rejects a blanket anti-enhancement 
position. He makes the case that enhancement is not new, citing the agrarian 
revolution, literacy and computers as examples of non-biomedical human 
enhancements (p 24). BME is not so different, he says, from these other historic 
human enhancements to warrant a separate moral category. Nevertheless, he also 
warns against blind faith in BME, highlighting the risks of unintended deleterious 
consequences (Chapters 4-7). He argues, however, that these risks can be managed 
(Chapters 4-7). In emphasising the importance of social, political and legal 
institutions in the regulation of BME, and the role of institutions in protecting against 
potential BME-related injustices, Buchanan usefully broadens the scope of the ethical 
questions surrounding BME and, as I discuss below, opens up new potential solutions. 
 
Chapters 1-4 are dedicated to rejecting a complete prohibition of BME. The two 
pillars of this argument are, first, that BME has the potential to further the human 
good, and second, that BME may be required simply to prevent deterioration in 
current levels of human well-being, in the face of threats such as serious 
environmental degradation. In Chapter 1 (ÔBreathless Optimism, Hysterical 
LoathingÕ), Buchanan reviews the main reasons why biomedical enhancements have 
provoked particular controversy, relative to other types of technological and bio-
technological enhancements. BME is seen by some 2  as morally different and 
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1 A Buchanan, Beyond Humanity?: The Ethics of Biomedical Enhancement (Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
2 As examples of those who harbour such concerns, Buchanan cites ÔbioconservativesÕ such as 
Ôconservative guru [Francis] FukuyamaÕ (p 53) and President BushÕs Council on Bioethics (p 58). 
particularly worrisome because of concerns that it changes human biology, alters the 
human gene pool, could change or destroy human nature, and amounts to Ôplaying 
GodÕ. These worries are dispatched in turn. 
 
Regarding concerns about BME changing human biology or the human gene pool, 
Buchanan makes the simple but important point that only a small subset of BME 
involves genetic enhancement (p 18). Even then, the worry is unfounded because the 
gene pool is, and always has been, changing due to natural selection. In Chapter 2 
(ÔWhy Evolution IsnÕt Good EnoughÕ), Buchanan dissects the arguments that Ônatural 
is always bestÕ, and that intentionally changing the gene pool is always wrong. He 
makes a distinction between Unintentional Genetic Modification (UGM) Ð otherwise 
known as natural selection - and Intentional Genetic Modification (IGM) Ð the use of 
technologies such as BME. Using colourful examples of how nature and evolution 
often produce flawed outcomes, Buchanan argues that reproductive fitness and the 
human good are not necessarily the same, or even related to one another (pp 70-73). A 
powerful example of this is that ÔMother Nature neglects her elderly childrenÕ (pp 32-
34). Since natural selection works on the basis of reproductive fitness, traits that 
damage the quality of life of older people are not necessarily filtered out. The effects 
of this are plain to see in the deteriorating health and quality of life of ageing 
populations around the world. Buchanan argues that if IGM could be used to correct 
what ÔnatureÕ has got wrong or neglected, then the human gene pool and the lives of 
individual humans could be significantly improved (Chapters 3-4).  
 
Buchanan re-frames the objection about destroying human nature as a worry that the 
good parts of human nature will be destroyed since, he says, it is obvious that human 
nature is a mixed bag and could be subject to some improvements. In Chapter 3 
(ÔChanging Human Nature?Õ), he suggests that this worry is grounded in an erroneous 
belief, which he calls the ÔExtreme Connectedness AssumptionÕ (pp 22-23). This 
assumption is that human nature is complex, in the sense that improving the bad parts 
risks inadvertently affecting the good parts. A more general version of this is the 
Ôseamless webÕ argument Ð that the whole human organism is interconnected, and 
tinkering in one place could cause unpredictable (and possibly bad) ripple effects (p 
80). While acknowledging that the risk of unintended deleterious consequences is a 
valid concern, Buchanan explains, in simple terms, why evidence from biology (in 
particular, the modularity of the human organism) contradicts the Extreme 
Connectedness Assumption and the seamless web argument (pp 82-84). On this basis, 
he rejects the objection from human nature. 
 
In response to the Playing God objection, he argues that ÔDonÕt play GodÕ is merely a 
warning against hubris, or arrogance (p 48). It might be viewed as good advice but it 
applies to all technologies and does not constitute an argument against BME. In 
Chapter 4 (ÔPlaying God, ResponsiblyÕ), Buchanan discusses how to temper hubris, 
and manage the risks of unintended consequences. He offers a set of ÔRisk Reduction 
Rules of ThumbÕ (pp 96-98). These are seven precautionary principles formulated to 
reduce the risk of bad unintended biological consequences resulting from the genetic 
engineering of organisms - from crops to humans. They are designed as what Rawls 
calls counting principles,3 such that the more of them that are satisfied, the more 
confident we can be that we are minimising risk. This part of the book has clear links 
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3 J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press 1971). 
to environmental and health policy, and is an important contribution to the policy 
literature. 
 
In Chapters 5 and 6 Buchanan turns to other, non-biological worries about BME. In 
Chapter 5 (ÔWill the Rich get Biologically Richer?Õ) he focuses on the argument that 
BME should be prohibited in the name of justice, because it could worsen unjust 
inequalities. He reiterates his earlier point that BME does not deserve a separate 
moral category, and that these are not morally unique or novel questions. Indeed, 
BME Ômay never produce gaps as large as the ones that exist now as the result of the 
combined social-natural lottery we all participate inÕ (p 106). Buchanan does, 
however, take the worry seriously, arguing that inequality of access to BME would 
constitute injustice if it left people vulnerable to domination or exclusion. 
Nonetheless, he claims that arguments from justice are often based on incorrect 
assumptions. Many people assume that biomedical enhancements are zero-sum, 
personal goods; that they are expensive market goods; and that the role of government 
will merely be to regulate the market (p 113). Using illustrative examples, Buchanan 
explains that many enhancements will, in fact, be positive-sum and that governments 
will have good reasons to treat some as public, rather than personal, goods. They will 
have a particular interest in the development and diffusion of enhancements that 
increase economic productivity and reduce social costs (pp 120-129). It is the role of 
political and legal institutions to guard against the worsening of unjust inequalities. 
 
In Chapter 6 (ÔIs Enhancement Corrupting?Õ) Buchanan makes a brief foray into 
virtue ethics. He discusses Michael SandelÕs objections to BME4 - that the pursuit of 
BME is a sign of bad character because it betrays the vices of an under-appreciation 
of what we have, and the inappropriate pursuit of perfection and mastery (pp 135-
143). Sandel is also concerned that BME undermines human agency and effort. 
Buchanan distills from these arguments a set of worries about the pursuit of BME: it 
could lead to what might be termed an Òenhancement treadmillÓ or the never-ending 
pursuit of better; it could eliminate chance and spontaneity from human life; it could 
lead to humans treating our current selves as mere means to (better) future selves; and 
it could corrupt valuable social relationships with others by increasing the expression 
of vices such as disloyalty (pp 145-148). BME could also cause Ômoral flabbinessÕ (p 
158) by becoming a shortcut to achieving valuable ends, leading to the atrophy of 
moral powers. As Buchanan puts it, ÔIf you can take a pill to ÒachieveÓ some 
excellence, will it still be an excellence?Õ (p 158). He argues, however, that most of 
this is Ôoverheated rhetoricÕ (p 171), and that BME is at least as likely to make us 
morally better than worse. Imagine, for example, enhancements that augmented the 
natural biochemical processes associated with moral virtues like truthfulness, loyalty 
or empathy (pp 154-158). Additionally, these risks are not unique to BME. If they are 
conclusive arguments against BME then they must also be conclusive arguments 
against any enhancement, including, for example, the cognitive enhancement of 
children by teaching them to read. This is, of course, absurd. Nevertheless, he ends 
the chapter by conceding that while Ôcharacter concernsÕ are not conclusive arguments 
against BME, they should be taken seriously because Ôthere are lots of ways you can 
go wrong in pursuing enhancements and some of them have to do with characterÕ (p 
171). 
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4 M Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in an Age of Genetic Engineering (Harvard University 
Press 2007). 
 In the final chapter (ÔThe Enhancement EnterpriseÕ), Buchanan sets out a positive 
approach to managing the Ôlots of ways you can go wrongÕ and harnessing BME for 
the human good. The main thread of the argument is that BME already exists and it is, 
therefore, better to recognise new technologies and to develop the social, political and 
legal institutions necessary to regulate them. The alternative is to allow enhancement 
technologies to creep in Ôthrough the back doorÕ via, for example, the development of 
new treatments for medical conditions. Using the front door requires institutional 
innovation alongside technological innovation. Buchanan calls for modifications in 
intellectual property law that would ensure the rapid and equitable diffusion of 
beneficial technologies, along with a new international institution that would reward 
Ôdiffusion entrepreneurshipÕ (p 127) and promote global justice in access to valuable 
BME. To decide which technologies are valuable and to draw difficult lines, such as 
the line between treatment and enhancement, there must be democratic debate. 
Buchanan concludes that ÔThe hardest work in the ethics of enhancement can begin 
once weÕve reached a consensus that biomedical enhancement can be a legitimate and 
even noble kind of activityÕ (p 182). 
 
Overall, Buchanan makes a convincing case that Ôsometimes there are good reasons to 
be better than wellÕ (p 173). By firmly situating biomedical enhancements and their 
implications for human well-being in the wider social-political-legal context in which 
they are developed and used, Buchanan implicitly draws upon a long tradition in 
philosophy that conceptualises human well-being not solely as an individual attribute 
but, in part, a function of a personÕs environment.5 As he clearly sets out, the scope of 
the ethical issues around BME is wider than potential deleterious biological 
consequences, and includes important questions about social, economic and political 
justice. These wider considerations about the socio-legal context of BME provide the 
foundation of the risk management strategies he proposes, in the shape of his set of 
precautionary principles (Chapter 4) and the institutional innovations outlined in the 
final chapter (discussed above). While he may not convince hard-line 
ÔbioconservativesÕ, his arguments are clear, well-structured and written in plain 
English with lots of everyday examples. As such, the book is an excellent introduction 
to the ethics of enhancement and would make good reading for those new to bioethics 
Ð undergraduates and policy-makers alike. 
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5 An Aristotelian approach to well-being in its social and environmental context is found in the 
Capabilities Approach developed by Amaryta Sen and Martha Nussbaum: A Sen, Commodities and 
Capabilities (North Holland, 1985); M Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities 
Approach (Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
